

Bonfire of creeds : the essential □
Ashis Nandy/ Ashis Nandy; New □
Delhi: Oxford University Press, □
2004. (324-338 p.)

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Towards an Alternative Politics of Psychology

SCIENTIFIC CHANGES ARE generally plotted along two axes. On the first axis are plotted changes in the structure of scientific knowledge. Such changes are seen as cumulative, universal and thus 'true', legitimate and valid. On the second axis are plotted changes in the culture of science, especially the shifting concept of science as a social activity. These changes are seen as non-cumulative, contentious and non-rational. Though they are seen as important, there still persists a vague feeling that they are an intrusion into the sphere of orderly scientific knowledge.

Such dichotomy between the text and context of science has worked well until quite recently. But it is now showing signs of breaking down. First of all, the coming-of-age of the social sciences has encouraged them to discount the nineteenth-century public image of the natural sciences. Imitative, self-hating and reductionist, the new sciences have nevertheless picked up from where medieval theology gave up. They have challenged the idea of science as a system of perfectly rational knowledge, separated from the imperfections of politics, culture and ethics. For the first time in human history a part of science itself, in the form of social sciences, has begun to argue that science is not a fully autonomous, rational, affectless pursuit; it too has its myths, magic and rituals, not merely in its culture as a context, but also in its core as a part of its text.

Second, the modern world's two open-eyed death-dances with the help of 'high' technology in this century—particularly that glorious achievement which allegedly made the scientists 'know sin'—have been

a great teacher. The fear of a limitless science they aroused has given a special meaning to the accumulated mass of data on scientific creativity and scientific functioning which show that there is not only a 'republic of science' but that the republic is part of a larger political and cultural order.

It is this loss of purity and innocence of science as a knowledge system which provides a new baseline for discussing the politics of contemporary psychology, particularly the prospects the science has of breaking away from its present culture. It also opens up the possibility of visualizing an alternative framework of scientific ethics based on a new political concept of the relationships between the psychologist and his work and between the psychologist and his subjects.

'Crisis' is an overworked term. Every generation believes itself to be in a crisis, coping with the problems thoughtlessly bequeathed to it by the earlier generation and tirelessly working for the betterment of the next. If however I am permitted use of the word 'crisis' to describe the predicament of modern psychology, I would like to define it in terms of a basic dilemma.

It is only in this century that 'psychological man' has truly come into his own. This is the age which has seen, on the one hand, what Philip Rieff has called 'the triumph of the therapeutic' and on the other, both a sharpened consciousness of consciousness and a full-blown consciousness of false consciousness. The falseness of conventional conceptions of false consciousness, too, has become more and more evident. We work now with what somebody has, in a different context, called 'the double falsity of consciousness'. Yet, at the same time, it is in this century that we have seen the climax of the process of mechanization of inanimate and animate nature, and ultimately of man himself, which started in the West in the seventeenth century. As a part of these twin processes, modern psychology has de-psychologized humanity in the age of psychological man. It has popularized a concept of the person which is for the most part mechanomorphic, two-dimensional and anti-psychological. In other words, what psychology has given with one, it has taken away with the other.

This could be put in another way. Our age has given the science of psychology a new political power by placing it at the centre of human life in society. The science has become one of the standards by which the quality of our lives is being valued or criticized. But our age has also made us aware of the way psychology has often been in league with the forces of cruelty, exploitation, and authoritarianism by taking for granted the endorsing of everyday incarnations of the 'banal evil' of our times

and by creating new hierarchies, hegemonies, and subjecthoods in the psychologia itself to make the science adjust to the modern world as it exists. It is my contention that the search for a new ethic of psychology cannot begin unless the link between these two processes, one contextual and one intra-disciplinary, is clearly perceived. The subjecthood that psychology promotes is inextricably a part of the politics of the science of psychology. The republic of psychology, in turn, is an extension of the role of the science in an inequitable, oligopolistic world of organized knowledge. I shall try to spell out here the implications of this reading of the politics of psychology. Such a reading will not, by itself, alter our vision of the future of the discipline. But as every psychotherapist intuitively knows, an imperfect interpretation, too, has its uses. Sensitizing a person or a group to the possibilities of looking within can itself be therapeutic and creative. Perhaps that which is true of a person or a group is not wholly untrue of a science.

My task is facilitated by the fact that psychology is one modern science that has a sub-tradition of self-exploration, however apolitically that self-exploration might have been defined until now. Though the science also has a developed capacity to 'manage' dissent by co-opting all dissent into the mainstream as so many new sub-disciplines within psychology, it is better equipped than many other sciences to cope with the new awareness that threatens the dominant culture of world science. After all, modern psychology was one of the first human sciences—the other being Marxist political economy—to unwittingly reject the split between the observer and the observed and to use the observer/observed dyad as its basic unit of analysis. The whole of modern psychology, it is true, did not participate in that early breakthrough. But much before particle physics made the use of such a unit fashionable, and certainly before structural anthropologists began to speak of the 'savage mind' as a double or a mirror—that is, before a serious onslaught on the mechanomorphic, Newtonian world-view came to be mounted—the depth-psychological model of therapeutic transaction implicitly defied dichotomy between the subject and the object. I am here not considering the psychological traditions of non-western civilizations that have never strayed from the vision that the knower is inextricably a part of the known and vice versa. I am here speaking of psychoanalysis and certain other schools of thought, like existential psychology, as I read them from outside the world of western psychology.

To make my point, I shall briefly describe two postulates common to some of the traditional psychologies and to the therapeutic tradition

pioneered by Freud. The first postulate is that the therapeutic situation is the epitome of all human intervention in personality, society and culture; the therapist is to therapy what the researcher is to research and the activist is to social intervention. If it involves subjects and objects, each situation of knowledge *is*—add the word 'symbolically' or 'analogically' if we wish to sound scientific and non-mystical—simultaneously all situations of human interaction. Responsibility therefore is always total for anyone trying to know. Sri Aurobindo, the Indian mystic, used to speak of his intervention in Stalingrad and in the Battle of Britain through his yoga during the Second World War. It could be seen as a comic-strip delusion of grandeur or as a symbolic reaffirmation of the organic unity of the universe. On one plane Aurobindo's 'insanity' was not very different from the link many establish between what Jean-Paul Sartre said in a Paris café and what happened in the marshes of Vietnam. It was this equation between the microscopic and the macroscopic which implicitly coloured much of Freud's work on human civilization and its discontents. It also coloured his position on the continuity between mental health and ill-health. Some well-meaning ego psychoanalysts and humanistic psychologists insist that Freud depended overly on the pathological or the clinical to build his general theory of mind. Their criticism is flawed by an insensitivity to the civilizational thrust of Freud's work. The pathology in the clinic *had* to reflect the pathology of the 'normal' world. It is only on the basis of such an assumption that psychoanalysis, against Freud's injunction, could serve as a world-view and a philosophy for many.

The second assumption, too, can be stated in terms of the experience of psychoanalytic psychology. It is actually a further development of the first principle. From the point of view of the 'savage', the *reductio* of the ethic of psychoanalysis can also be written as:

Therapist : counter-transference :: patient : transference

The patient, in other words, is isomorphic to the therapist in that the processes of transference and counter-transference constitute a single process split by an extraneous factor—the acquired ability to 'work through' in the case of the counter-transference of the therapist, and the future possibility of acquiring this ability in the case of the transference of the patient. Intervention, the model says, is always self-intervention; alloplasticity always involves an element of autoplaticity. Thus, there is not only a continuity between health and ill-health, but also between the patient and the healer. The therapeutic situation is always corrupted—and enriched—by the interacting experiences, ideologies and inner struggles of the participants. As he helps the patient to regain health,

the therapist, too, moves towards his own health. The therapist does not arrive fully healthy or finished from his training. Nor is his goal the identification of a clientele, even for the sake of a 'client-centred' therapy. Rather, it is assumed that in making any interpretation, the interpreter has to come to terms with himself through his work. To the extent the interpretation reflects the interpreter, it is autobiographical and self-exploratory. It represents a shared experience rather than an impersonal contract artificially personalized for the sake of functional gains. It generates a new language of bilaterality rather than decodifying a private language in terms of the public categories of a profession.

The vision has another implication which can be teased out of the recent 'anti-psychiatric' works on madness and culture. To the extent that the therapist co-constructs the patient's environment, he bears responsibility for the patient's patienthood. The suffering of the patient is produced, as well as defined, by his environment, which in turn is a construction in which the patient and the therapist participate. Responsibility in this sense, too, is always shared by the patient and the therapist, the subject and the researcher, and by civilizations that have been 'sick' and civilizations that have specialized in seeing other civilizations as patients to be healed or counselled. What the patient is, the argument goes, cannot be separated from what the therapist is. If the patient's illness is definitionally linked to the therapist's health, it becomes the therapist's illness too. In this reading of the discipline of psychology, there are no victors so long as there are victims. Subjecthood is shared and health, too, is indivisible.

I am trying to argue that psychology has neglected the humane implications of some of its own traditions and that of the living traditions of non-modern psychologies. It has developed a disciplinary culture that recognizes 'contamination' but spends its entire effort on purifying research from this contamination, exactly as it recognizes that the laboratory differs from real life but, instead of thinking of the laboratory as another enriching experience, seeks to remove the difference between the laboratory and life. Yet, this is one contamination that could have been used creatively to discover a clue to the way some persons and cultures must be defined as the known (or as the knowable) for others to be defined as the knowers, exactly as some persons and cultures must be defined as mentally unhealthy in order that others can be defined as healthy. The organized attempt to bypass this issue has eroded the psychologist's ability to study the 'experience of experience' (an ability which, according to R.D. Laing, makes psychology the science of science) and it has made the psychologist captive to the intellectually and ethically

sterile idea of an absolute disjunction between the researcher and his subject, and between the healer and his patient. Moreover, as the researchers and the healers predominantly belong to particular cultures and politics, this inability has parochialized psychology and promoted as features of the dominant 'eupsychia'—Abraham Maslow's expression for a psychological Utopia—the psychological characteristics of the privileged, the successful and the powerful.

To reinstate the idea of a community between the observer and the observed as the basic unit of analysis in psychology and the idea of a shared, global responsibility (a sub-category of the idea of oneness of experience and of the universe, as some Vedantists and Sufis view it), we shall have to make two other postulates or assumptions. Both follow from the two assumptions discussed above. These new assumptions, or at least one of them, may seem hackneyed to readers brought up on a staple diet of radical sociology of knowledge, but they do define for me the baseline of all psychology worth the name.

The first assumption is that political psychology is not the name of a sub-discipline or a circumscribed domain of knowledge where politics and psychology intersect. Every psychology is political and each psychological theory is a political statement. The second is that there are many psychologies and the ruling culture of psychology, being controlled by modern psychology, is hostile to such a view of psychologia.

The first assumption parallels Harold Lasswell's concept that politics is not merely the name of a social sub-system but also a quality or form of social relationship. It denies that an apolitical psychology is possible. It affirms that each science reflects not merely a set of scientific norms but also a set of political preferences. This is, of course, another way of saying that all attempts to resist the entry of alternative political values in psychology, by raising the slogan of value-neutrality, are attempts to promote one kind of politics of science at the cost of others. A science that defines itself as value-free can be democratic only to the extent that it does not have to accommodate a science that is value-laden by design; a science that has built-in values and defines all science as normative has the scope (whether or not actualized), to see even ultra-scientific fraternity. After all, the openly normative sciences, by their own principles, must see the value-free sciences as indirectly expressing a different set of values. (This of course raises the question of whether non-modern psychologies can truly stand up to modern psychology with its anti-democratic concept of science and its missionary zeal. The question parallels two old questions: should democratic rights be given to the anti-democrats?)

And can there be a coexistence of faiths when some are proselytizing and others are not? The answer this time, too, has to be the same; it is the fate of some creeds to be tolerant of the intolerant in order to retain their identity.)

The first assumption, by now familiar to most social scientists, is an uneasy one to make for many psychologists. The entire literature on the political sociology of science has been bypassed by modern psychology and despite all its self-exploratory traditions, the assumption may still seem like a compromise with scientific sanity to many psychologists. Though most psychologists recognize the social context of science, in practice they see large parts of their disciplinary text as functionally autonomous. They certainly show little awareness that many of the ethical problems of their science are political in nature and that one of the main challenges facing them today is to produce a new politics of psychology.

The second assumption implies that so-called modern psychology is no less an ethnopsychology than the 'primitive', traditional, local or folk psychologies; it is only another traditional psychology that has managed politically to corner the other traditions of psychology with the help of a new theory of progress. From B.F. Skinner's utopia beyond freedom and dignity through the more positivist readings of psychoanalysis to the strident political psychology of some of the radical schools trying to 'conscientize' the underdogs and retool the ahistorical cultures, modern psychology has served as the ethnopsychology of a small part of the world and peddled itself as a universal psychology on the basis of the political, economic and cultural dominance of precisely that part. Someone once defined language as a dialect with political, economic and military power. It is possible to see modern psychology as a language in this sense.

I hasten to clarify that these remarks do not constitute a new plea for a more culturally relative psychology. They are a plea for a more plural culture of world psychology and for the coexistence of numerous universal psychologies produced both within and outside the known world of knowledge. I am suggesting that psychology need not be the name of a game in which universal models generated by modern psychology are applied to different cultures, with or without theoretical modifications, to cope with 'deviant' or 'odd' data sets. I am suggesting that it is possible to see each culture of psychology as an aspect of a world-view that is no less universal than modern psychology. Each cross-cultural setting thus becomes an interface between at least two ethnopsychologies—one of them likely to be local, rooted in the indigenous lifestyle, implicit, and usable as a critique of the imported; the other likely to be imported,

explicit and, at its best, usable as a critique of the native one. It is a confrontation between two competing universal psychologies, both equally culture-bound but not often equally powerful. In such a view there is a place for modern psychology, even outside the modern world. That place, however, is limited.

The last argument can be formulated a little differently if our focus is on the person. One pay-off of seeing psychology as a confederation of ethnic psychologies is to view each psychological phenomenon or process as an experience, interpretable in terms of an encounter of the ethnopsychology of the subject and the ethnopsychology of the interpreter, and to see this encounter as generating its own set of concepts and an ideographic 'model' that may or may not be usable in other situations. The role of a psychological theory here becomes that of a critical catalyst (in both senses of the term 'critical') in a series of interpretive models.

In both formulations, this view circumvents the inner contradiction of those who claim that a value-free psychology is not possible and, in the same breath, accuse western psychologists of ethnocentrism for articulating western values. I am arguing that there are actually two models of handling ethnicity in psychology. One in which we cleanse the science of all forms of ethnicity; the other in which we tolerate and, in fact, cherish such ethnicity, and promote mutual criticism and dialogue. In the first case, there is always the danger of the so-called secular domain of science becoming a masked expression of a particular form of ethnicity. In the second case, that danger is mitigated because the goal is politically to balance each ethnicity by developing a culture of checks and counter-checks. It is my contention that the creative possibilities of the first concept of ethnicity in science has by now been almost fully exhausted and that it is time for us to explore the creative possibilities of the second conception of ethnicity.

To understand why such a 'retrogressive' model of tolerance of ethnicity is necessary, a word here about the kinds of political awareness often used as bulwarks against the ethnocidal and inequitable aspects of modern psychology.

One way in which the problem of ethnic 'contamination' of modern psychology has been handled is through external criticism of the science. Mostly such criticism has been levelled from the vantage point of one of the major ideological components of modernity (generally the critical modernity of some forms of radicalism or the conformist modernity of some aspects of liberalism); the other way has been to work towards

an internal criticism or professional self-correction, as in cross-cultural and humanistic psychologies. Both forms of criticism have shown major limitations.

As for the former, most schools of radical psychology are heavily committed to some version or another of the doctrine of progress. Their evolutionism forces them to ignore the basic politics of cultures and to contribute handsomely to the existing patterns of cultural and intellectual dominance, often while fighting the overt economic and political hegemony of classes, societies and nation-states. By positing a new person and a new culture in the future, and by placing the ahistorical, non-modern societies farthest from those ideals, what such radicalism gives in the form of sensitivity to the socio-economic exploitation of parts of the world, it takes away by usurping a hegemonic role in the life of mind as a phalanx of an advanced consciousness. It, too, reduces the psychologies of the rest of the world to second-class citizenship, even in the world of future knowledge and in the non-exploitative Utopias of the future. It does so (a) by positing a science that is apolitical in its content and faulty only in its context, and (b) by identifying all criticism of the two central myths of our times—science and history—as counter-revolutionary conspiracy. The core of this tradition of external criticism is an idea of the person-in-society that is caught in a historical play of villains and victims. According to the radical script, only the second-rate versions of the play are available in the provincial repertoires of the ahistorical societies. The assassination of the characters of persons and societies is written into the charter of such a radicalism and there can be no appeal against its ultimate verdict, based on a specialist knowledge of the 'science' of history. The concept of Oriental despotism is the ultimate example of its typical analytic tools.

On the other hand, the idea of contractual, competitive individuality in some forms of liberalism, when combined with the technological worldview of nineteenth-century science, has proved to be a deadly coinage. It seeks to reduce every psychological insight into a saleable, packaged, consumption item, purchasable at the shop-counter of the psychologist as a patented cure for loneliness, inefficiency, boredom, sadness, violence, stupidity—anything which is maladjustive to mainstream modern consciousness. We avoid the politics of knowledge, the argument goes, if we focus on the practical and try to solve small, real-life problems instead of running after the mirage of a holistic psychology. This anti-metaphysics is not a matter of innocent pragmatism. It is a systematic effort to discourage questions about the basic features of modern psychology

and to legitimize the forces of the status quo through a manipulative, applied psychology geared to an instrumental view of individuals, groups and cultures.

One plank of such liberalism is the theory of modernization, now dying a slow death in social psychology. The theory has relativized many of its micro-theories with the help of empirical work all over the globe. But it has absolutized the social goals of the Enlightenment as the last word in human visions of a desirable society. The history of Utopias has come to an end and so have, reportedly, alternative civilizational visions of the future. Thus, the principle of cultural relativism has become part of a game in which modern psychological discourse is deepened, not by alternative world-views but by cross-cultural data. These data are then fitted into a hierarchy of value systems and seen in an evolutionary perspective. Psychological resistances to economic development, modern science and 'high' technology, to participation in western political institutions and in the nation-state system, and even resistances to the growth of a respectable revolutionary consciousness become proper subjects of research, and it is implicitly assumed that, while the non-western psychologists would produce data on and micro-theories for their own societies, the psychologists in the First World would have to have the responsibility of producing theories appropriate not only for their own corner but for the world as a whole.

Caught in this ethical grid, the modern psychologist has remained insensitive to the oppression of the unilinear, diachronic models of social change and scientific growth. He has ignored the oppression of the idea of history and the consequent crises of those cultures that have borne the brunt of the 'scientific' history of a few select societies seeking to subvert all visions of a desirable society except their own. Psychological studies of ethnocentrism show no awareness that one can be partial not only to one's national culture but also to one's national history. It is probably in human nature to use strange cultures or alien histories as psychological dystopias. Whatever the reason, the modern psychologist has shown no concern for the struggle for cultural survival of the perpetual 'subjects' of psychology, of those who seek liberation from the stranglehold of modern history and modern science themselves. Nor is he aware that this battle for survival is also a battle for survival of a variety of classical and folk psychologies, of, in fact, psychology in its full ethnic richness.

Finally, something is held in common by both conventional Marxist and liberal concepts of a science of mind. Modern psychology has never clearly separated science and technology, nor has it given science any

intrinsic legitimacy as a philosophical criticism of the existing world and everyday life. The psychologist's scientism is mostly simple-minded technologism. Like the post-Galilean natural scientists, the psychologist too has sought legitimacy in theories of doing, not being. This has further bound the discipline to the dominant culture of science—to competition, achievement, productivity and control over man and nature. Psychology has gradually become a bastion of non-critical pragmatism.

Thus, the psychologist has often sought to identify himself with the educationally backward, the economically underdeveloped or the politically powerless. But he has rarely questioned the conceptions of education, intellect, development, maturity, and national interest. He has bought his concepts wholesale from other social scientists and tried to weld them into a managerial construction of human consciousness. If this seems an unfair criticism of a 'normal science', let us not forget that hundreds of departments of psychology the world over are trying to live out these meanings of their discipline, while their subjects are discovering in the psychological correlates of uncritically examined variables like development, education, population control and management, new forms of institutionalized violence, ethnocide and exploitation. Take, for instance, the way correlates have often been used as causal explanations in social psychology. Because economic backwardness is mostly non-western, the large mass of research on psychological aspects of economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s only dutifully confirmed that backwardness was a result of the non-westernness of individuals and cultures. Apart from being circular, this reasoning neglected that backwardness was often the flip side of the state of 'advancement' and that the structural basis of such advancement could not be sustained without backwardness in large parts of the globe. The studies ignored that a great part of the human race might have been cussedly resisting the loving embrace of an economic system which they know to be oppressive as well as totalizing.

Similarly, one of the morals of the now-dying IQ debate for me is that it would not have mattered if Cyril Burt had been an honest researcher. Intelligence testing had already done what it had set out to do: banish the traditional concepts of intellect, make intelligence an instrument and an adjunct to conventional socio-economic status, and hegemonize the concept of intelligence by applying the slogan 'intelligence is what intelligence tests measure'. The consequences had ultimately to be independent of the personal ethics of IQ researchers like Sir Cyril. The psychologist's idea of intelligence could not fight the fact that, along the dimensions valued by the powerful and the privileged, the powerless and the underprivileged perform poorly. If we construct and validate our

own measures of our favourite being-states and processes, with reference to performance within structures we ourselves have set up or dominate, and then go about assessing the rest of world according to these measures, the results cannot be otherwise. But then, it should also not surprise us if, to the rest of the world, the measurement looks less like science and more like a conspiracy.

The stratagem of internal criticism has a different thrust. I have already indirectly discussed it in my remarks on non-critical cultural relativism which constitutes the ethical core of conventional cross-cultural psychology or, for that matter, humanistic psychology. Only one more point remains to be made. Such relativism was originally a response to the indiscriminate universalism that mirrored the parochial cultures in which the social sciences had grown. And it was supposed to correct the bias of the first generation of social scientists, often drawn from among Christian missionaries and colonial bureaucrats. But political processes are made of more resilient stuff than conceptual innovations in the social sciences. And the idea of cultural relativism was soon co-opted by that particularism which the relativism was supposed to fight. Even in their more sophisticated versions, most cross-cultural and humanistic psychologies see modern psychology as a transcultural reservoir of knowledge and other psychologies as its handicapped cohorts waiting to be interpreted by and integrated with the world of modern psychology. The other psychologies thus become, definitionally, mixed bags of good and bad insights and good and bad data. The good in them are to be swallowed by modern psychology, the bad rejected. Neither cross-cultural nor humanistic psychology, despite the best of intentions, can grant alternative psychologies the right to integrate within the latter what they see as the best of modern psychology and to reject the bad.

The implication of seeing the non-modern psychologies as sacks of isolated insights or data is that these insights and data can then be used to ornament, strengthen or alter the micro-theories of modern psychology. The basic paradigms and culture of modern psychology remain untouched and are, in fact, carefully adapted to new empirical facts. What changes over time are the microtheories, not the architectonics of modern psychology. Yet, as I have said, what is particularist about the latter is not merely its data or sub-theories but also its postulates about the nature of science and about the human situation from which scientific knowledge emerges.

All this may seem like a frontal attack on modern psychology. Actually, it is an attempt to make the trite point that imperfect societies produce

imperfect psychologies, even when such psychologies are avowedly radical or cross-cultural. And that imperfection colours not only the data and the theories but also the conception of psychology as a science. Even concept of knowledge is imperfect, coming as it does from another imperfect culture. All I can claim for this critique is that it does not see any given psychology as the end-state of an evolutionary process of scientific growth; it sees the discipline as a confederation of mutually tolerant and mutually critical cultures of understanding and studying the human mind. I only hope that such a view—and it is an avowedly political view—grapples at least indirectly with a problem that cultural relativism has never taken seriously: how to sustain within the culture of psychology a critical tradition while not denying cultural and normative plurality.

By now it should be obvious that I do not see the future of psychology as a paradigm-scarce discipline which, according to Thomas Kuhn, would be an indicator of its maturity as a science. I cherish its paradigm-surplus status as an indicator of its strength, a reflection of its simultaneous rootedness in a number of philosophical systems. Psychology to me is vital for a future dialogue of philosophies, world-views and civilizations. I do not expect the science to increase human choices through improved psycho-techniques or greater control over the human environment; I expect it to widen human choices by enriching self-awareness and by exploring varieties of social experience.

This means that the task of the psychologist today is not only to widen the spatial and temporal scope of the discipline but also to examine the meanings, experiences and values associated with different psychological systems. Unless the second task is recognized, modern psychology will only manage to bring newer cultural areas and larger time spans within its scope; it will further marginalize other traditions of psychology. That way lies homogenization.

The alternative I am suggesting might also give a new dignity to those parts of psychology that concern themselves with society. Traditionally, social psychology has accepted obsequiously the lexicon of other modern sciences. Often it has set up crudely measured 'non-psychological' dependent variables and then studied the psychological correlates of the variables. Acceptance of an urban-industrial environment and an impersonal, contractual work situation thus becomes the criteria of maturity as well as progress as in the work of Alex Inkeles and his associates; per capita income or the consumption of electricity or steel becomes the prime measure of the economic growth of a nation, as in David C. McClelland's work with the achievement motive; academic

performance within a doubtful educational system validates the measures of intelligence for a whole generation of IQ-testers; and a two-party system or a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy becomes the measure of political development or democratization for another generation of political psychologists. This, we are then told, is what operationalism is all about.

Such uncritical acceptance of the categories used by the other social sciences has bound psychology to some of the most retrograde ideas in political and social philosophy. It has produced a science of mind which not merely discourages any debate on issues such as the meanings of growth, development, intelligence, democracy and health but it also ignores the psychological contexts that set up these variables as valued qualities and give them their meanings.

Health of people and societies, I repeat, is indivisible. As the dominant schools of psychology have collaborated in dismantling alternatives to the post-Enlightenment West, as they have helped destroy the autonomy, freedom and self-respect of the barbarians, these schools have themselves sunk deeper into the morass of a disciplinary culture characterized by over-organization, hyper-competitiveness, ritualism and anti-intraceptiveness. The wages of sin for one, says Irish Murdoch paraphrasing Plato, is the kind of person one becomes. As the psychologists have embraced technocracy, part-object relations and some forms of anti-psychologism as parts of their code, they have settled down into a fragmented, dull professionalism and converted their science into an industry. Their over-allegiance to 'normal' science has ousted most possibilities of 'revolutionary' science. That is the inner logic of all dominance and of all attempts to secure one's autonomy by abridging the autonomy of others. No wonder that the ontological problems of modern psychology are exactly along those planes on which modern psychology has tried to marginalize alternative traditions of psychology as non-scientific, overtly philosophical, non-utilitarian, non-predictive and non-productive.

The search for a humane psychology never ends. What looks like a morally desirable psychology to one generation, looks like a disguise for subtle forms of dominance, oppression and institutionalized suffering to the next. This could be read as an indicator of human fickleness and as a weakness of psychology; it could be read as an indicator of the social sensitivity and sense of survival of psychology as a social science and as a philosophy. I prefer the second formulation. It is the strength of the science that every generation of psychologists must discover the scope and limits of their science in terms of the explicit and implicit utopias they live with. They are, after all, dealing with human consciousness.

Thus, the ethical issues I have raised here should also be dead in a few years' time. That does not mean that political problems of psychology would end. That means that a new critical awareness will look for a new set of norms for psychology and tear the mask off this defence of ethno-psychology. That will not be a great loss for me. Unlike the modern critical traditions of Vico, Herder, Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, the ancient critical traditions of Madhyamika do allow for unending criticism and for criticisms of criticisms.